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A more than a few of the authors for this Symposium observe,
the past fifteen years have seen a dramatic increase in scholarly
Jpublishing on the topic of statutory interpretation, as well as an
escalation in the volume (measured in both numbers of cases and the
decibel level displayed in some of the opinions) of judicial forays into the
subject. It seems, therefore, like a propitious moment to pause and take
stock, to examine the developments revealed in the law reviews and in
the case reporters. Accordingly, I applaud the editors of the SMU Law
Review for their commitment to this Symposium and thank the authors
for their thought-provoking articles.
One of the reasons often cited for the burgeoning interest in statutory
interpretation is the "statutorification" of American law in this century.'
There can be no real doubt about the rise of statute law.2 For verifica-
tion, one need only look at the course catalog of any law school in
America,3 or at the dockets of the United States Courts of Appeals. As
* Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
1. The word is usually credited to then-Dean Guido Calabresi. See GuIDo CALA-
BRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982), although (as Dean Calabresi
notes) Professor Grant Gilmore commented seven years earlier that this country was en-
gaged in an "'orgy of statute making,'" id. (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERI-
CAN LAW 95 (1977)), and the truth of his words was undoubtedly widely accepted many
years before that.
2. It is striking, however, that over the same two decades that law reviews have de-
voted an increasing percentage of their pages to the interpretation of statutes (most of
them federal), there has been a corresponding downturn in Congress' production of its
primary work product. For example, the 105th Congress (the last to complete two full
sessions) enacted into law 394 public bills and 10 private bills. See 145 CONG. REC. D29
(daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999). By contrast, the 91st Congress enacted 695 public bills into law
and 246 private bills. See 116 CONG. REC. D739-40 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 1971). Divided gov-
ernment does not provide a ready explanation, since both Presidents Nixon and Clinton
came into office with Congresses that were controlled by the opposite party during these
years, see Session Summary, Party Leaders, Turnover in 1969, XXV CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY ALMANAC (91ST CONG. 23 (1969); Congressional Overview, XLIX CONGRES-
SIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC, 103RD CONG. 4 (1993), nor does expenditure of effort,
since both Congresses spent comparable numbers of hours in session and recorded similar
numbers of yea/nay votes.
3. Here at SMU there are at least 80 upper-level courses with a principal focus upon
federal or state statutory law and with judicial attempts to interpret them, from Adminis-
trative Law, Antitrust, and Bankruptcy to Unincorporated Business Associations, White
Collar Crime, and Wills and Trusts. See SMU SCHOOL OF LAW, 1999-2001 CATALOG 55-78.
Even the first-year curriculum-which has long been criticized for emphasizing appellate
cases and the common law at the expense of public law in general and statutory analysis in
particular-shows to varying degrees the effects of "statutorification" (e.g., Civil Proce-
dure (significant sections of the federal judicial code and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure), Contracts (Uniform Commercial Code), Criminal Law (various state and model
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Professor Crespi points out in his article,4 law review scholarship in the
field has also increased significantly, particularly during the period on
which he focuses, 1988 to 1997. Professor Crespi (perhaps wisely) does
not speculate as to the reasons for the blooming of this particular aca-
demic rose, but I will offer two.
First is the pioneering scholarship of Professor Bill Eskridge and Phil
Frickey, whose law review articles on the subject began appearing in
1985-865 and culminated in the publication of the first edition of their
casebook,6 which was immediately lauded by Judge Posner for having
"done for legislation what Hart and Sacks did for legal process, or Hart
and Wechsler for federal courts: it has demonstrated the existence of a
subject. ' '7 That three of the seven law review articles most frequently
cited by courts should be by one or both of these writers should come as
no real surprise.8 More importantly, their articles and casebook signaled
the rest of the academy that there was real gold to be mined out of statu-
tory interpretation, and (like the original '49ers), the rest of us were only
too happy to follow the path.
The last two decades would have provided much less material for aca-
demics to write about, however, had it not been for the second major
cause of this publication activity: the ascendance to the federal bench of a
small group of vocal, provocative, and dynamic judicial activists who were
committed to changing the way judges interpreted statutes. I am thinking
primarily of Judge Frank Easterbrook (who took his commission in April
1985), Judge Alex Kozinski (November 1985), and-primus inter pares-
Justice Antonin Scalia (who joined the U.S. Court of Appeals in 1982 and
the U.S. Supreme Court in September 1986). 9 These three textualists
have produced a body of case law and extra-judicial writings that chal-
lenge the eclecticism and pragmatism that have been the hallmark of stat-
utory interpretation for most of this century.
penal codes), Property (zoning ordinances and other public land-use regulation, landlord-
tenant law, conveyancing statutes), and even Torts (at least statutory contribution and
indemnification schemes, if not also the Restatement (Second) of Torts)).
4. Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of a Decade of Statutory Interpretation Schol-
arship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 53 SMU L. REV. 9 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Judge Wisdom and Voting Rights: The Judicial Artist as
Scholar and Pragmatist, 60 TUL. L. REV. 276 (1985); Philip P. Frickey, The Constitutional-
ity of Legislative Committee Suspension of Administrative Rules: The Case of Minnesota, 70
MINN. L. REV. 1237 (1986).
6. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988).
7. Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 74 VA. L. REv. 1567, 1571 (1988).
8. What comes as a surprise, at least to me, is the unambitious use to which these
articles have been put by the courts. As Professor Crespi observes, most if not all of the
judicial citations have been "simply to lend academic support to the application of a stan-
dard, straightforward principle of statutory interpretation that was referred to generally
and superficially by the article, and that was well-established long before the publication of
that article." Crespi, supra note 4, at 21. For a journeyman scholar working in these fields,
it is discouraging enough that over half of the judicial citations were to seven articles (out
of 132), written by two Supreme Court justices and three leading scholars, but for them not
even to be cited for the good stuff is almost too much to bear.
9. See Federal Judicial Center's website: <http://air.fjc.gov/history/judges-frm.html>.
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"Statutory interpretation," as practiced by the academics and judges
whose work is discussed in the pages of this Symposium, is practically a
blood sport. As Judge Abner Mikva 10 and Professor Eric Lane demon-
strate, the textualist revolution is not just about abstruse theories of lan-
guage and theories of legislative process." Nothing less than a political
counter-revolution is behind the move to limit statutes to their plain
meaning, even when the meaning of the statutory text is anything but
clear. Mikva and Lane argue that Justice Scalia's textualist revolution has
usefully curbed some of the eclectic tradition's excessive reliance upon
legislative history, but has generally failed to achieve the goals set by judi-
cial conservatism for itself. Their article explores, among other themes,
the two ways in which statutory interpretation has shown its political na-
ture, not only as a mediating force between Congress and the Executive,
between the political branches and the judiciary, and between the central
federal government and the states, but also as an occasional corrective for
political judgments with which the judicial author disagrees.
Political considerations need not always be the source of disagreement
about the Court's interpretations. In his contribution to this Symposium,
Louis Fisher emphasizes the institutionalist considerations that should in-
form the Court's reading of statutory language. 12 Fisher argues that the
doctrine of separation of powers, as well as a healthy respect for the limi-
tations of the judiciary as a source of public policy, both provides a useful
source of judicial restraint and justifies at least limited inquiries into ex-
tra-textual sources in order to respect Congress' distinct role as the au-
thor of federal policy.
This institutionalist perspective is also pursued by Professor John Rob-
erts, who offers a detailed discussion of the possible meanings of key
terms in the 1996 Telecommunications Act.13 He considers Congress, the
courts themselves, agencies, and industry groups all as potential sources
of meaning and argues for a more supple and realistic approach to read-
ing statutes. In particular, Professor Roberts gives the Chevron doc-
trine 14 a hard look and suggests ways to correct what he regards as the
10. As honorable a title as it is, "Judge" hardly does justice to Abner Mikva's decades
of public service, beginning with his year as a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Sherman
Minton (1951-52), and continuing through his years as an Illinois state representative
(1956-1966), member of Congress (1969-1973, 1975-79), a member (and eventually Chief
Judge) of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit), and then White House Counsel
(1994-95) to which the title of "Professor" may be added again (Judge Mikva taught at
Northwestern's law school from 1973-75 and is currently a visiting profess at the Illinois
University College of Law and Senior Fellow at Illinois; Institute of Government and Pub-
lic Affairs). See id.
11. See Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice Scalia's Revolutionary Call
to Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. Rav. 121 (2000).
12. See Louis Fisher, Statutory Construction: Keeping a Respectful Eye on Congress, 53
SMU L. REv. 49 (2000).
13. See John C. Roberts, The Sources of Statutory Meaning: An Archaeological Case
Study of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 53 SMU L. REv. 145 (2000).
14. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984) (stating that if Congress has been silent or ambiguous on an issue, courts
should ordinarily defer to "reasonable" or "plausible" agency interpretations).
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four fundamental mistakes upon which the doctrine is based.
Professors Clark and Charles Kelso suggest in their article that one way
to bring order to the seeming chaos of competing political, institutional,
and linguistic philosophies is to stop looking to interpretive theories for a
Grand Unifying Theme. 15 Instead, they suggest, based upon their de-
tailed review of the statutory cases of the Supreme Court's 1998 Term,
the lack of a single, coherent approach may be traced to the fact that the
justices on the current Court represent four distinct approaches to judi-
cial decision making. To that extent, the eclecticism that has marked the
Court's approach to reading statutes for much of this century is an appro-
priate middle course that puts statutory text first but does not hesitate to
test interpretations against common sense, legislative purpose, historical
context, and other extra-textual sources of decision.
One of Professor Eskridge's more controversial contributions to this
field has been his advocacy of "dynamic" statutory interpretation, which
allows a court to update a statute to reflect contemporary social mores,
evolving tort doctrine, or other post-enactment developments. 16 Two
leading examples of dynamic statutory interpretation in action are Li v.
Yellow Cab Co. of Cal.17 and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States.18 In each
case, the court chose to update the meaning of the statute before them to
reflect tort law developments in the law of comparative fault (Li) or the
national public policy against racially segregated schools as reflected in
the common law of charitable trusts (Bob Jones). One of the things that
made the decision so difficult in each instance was the court was walking
along a shifting border that allegedly separates the common law from
statute law. While statutes are usually understood to be enacted in dero-
gation of the common law, both courts consciously relied upon many de-
cades (and in the case of Li, a century) of common law development to
achieve a result that the statutes' drafters could not have dreamed was
possible. Two of the articles in this Symposium consider the complex
question of the relationship of statutes to the common law. Professor
Jonathan Turley recounts his experiences with a case that rests at the in-
tersection of environmental law and national security law in an attempt to
determine when, if ever, it is appropriate for the common law to trump
the plain meaning of a statute. 19 Professor Daniel Farber offers up a de-
tailed examination of the New York Court of Appeals' landmark decision
in Riggs v. Palmer,20 in part to consider how a court should determine
15. See J. Clark Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation: Four Theories in
Disarray, 53 SMU L. REV. 81 (2000).
16. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479
(1987).
17. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
18. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
19. Jonathan Turley, Through a Looking Glass Darkly: National Security and Statutory
Interpretation, 53 SMU L. REV. 207 (2000).
20. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that a grandson who was the main beneficiary
under his grandfather's will and who was also convicted of murdering the same grandfather
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where a statute leaves off and the common law begins, or (to put it an-
other way) when a statute preempts otherwise relevant common law. 21
As all of the articles in this Symposium demonstrate, the most recent
two decades of scholarly commentary on statutory interpretation have
solved very little. There is still much work to be done, and the pieces
offered in this issue make a splendid contribution to the field.
could not inherit under the will, or at least had to give up his ill-gotten gains to the residual
beneficiaries).
21. Daniel A. Farber, Courts, Statutes, and Public Policy: The Case of the Murderous
Heir, 53 SMU L. REV. 31 (2000).
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